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The distributive trade sector is the principal link between 
producers and consumers. The part it plays as an interme-
diary is reflected in the fact that its value added totals an 
average of 25  % of the consumer price of goods in the 
euro area. The distributive trade sector is composed of 
three sub-sectors : wholesale trade, retail trade and auto-
mobile trade. The retail trade is particularly important to 
the economy, because retailers set many consumer prices. 
As a result, the degree of competition and, more gener-
ally, the structural characteristics of the retail segment are 
critical parts of any analysis of price formation.
Retail trade is constantly evolving, and the forces that 
have shaped it in recent years have affected its structure, 
and thus consumer prices and inflation as well. Apart 
from consolidation and growing internationalisation, we 
are also seeing, for the euro area as a whole – though to 
different extents depending on the country – a simultane-
ous rise in the market shares of discounters, private label 
brands and online retailers.
This article draws largely on the Eurosystem’s 2011 
Structural Issues Report (SIR). This October 2011 report, 
entitled “Structural features of distributive trades and 
their impact on prices in the euro area”, was prepared 
by a Eurosystem task force in which the NBB took part. 
Moreover, one source of inspiration for the report was the 
Baugnet et al. article published in the September 2009 
Economic Review on the same topic.
The article here aims to pinpoint the current situation in 
Belgium through a comparison with the past and with 
the situation in the three main neighbouring countries 
(Germany, France and the Netherlands), as well as in the 
euro area overall. It focuses on the retail trade, and more 
specifically the grocery trade  (1), in part because it has 
the largest market share and in part for practical reasons 
having to do with the availability of comparable data for 
all the countries.
The first chapter reviews some of the distributive trade 
sector’s structural characteristics and recent developments. 
We illustrate the significant weight of distributive trade in 
the economy, and also note the specific nature of employ-
ment in the sector. Following an analysis of market share 
according to the different categories of grocery points of 
sale, we look at the three principal recent developments 
in the retail trade segment (the growing importance of 
discounters, private labels and online sales). The second 
chapter focuses on retail industry regulations, relying on 
two indicators  : the OECD’s Product Market Regulation 
indicator, updated for 2010, and a new indicator for point-
of-sale opening hours, both calculated using information 
supplied by the task force. The third chapter is devoted 
to the competitive landscape, measured by the level of 
concentration among grocery retailers as well as by profit 
margin. In addition, the degree of competition at the local 
level is analysed on the basis of the methodology from 
the NBB’s Baugnet et al. article (2009), and the situation 
in Belgium is compared with that of nine other euro area 
countries. Lastly, chapter four attempts to describe and 
illustrate the impact of the sector’s degree of competition 
and structural characteristics on price formation, using 
several analyses from various angles.
(1)  The grocery sector includes not only food products, but also the common 
household goods sold in supermarkets.36
Chart 1  Economic significAncE of thE DistriButivE trADE sEctor
(percentage of the private sector, financial sector excluded, 2007 figures)  (1)
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Sources : Eurostat SBS database and Eurosystem calculations.
(1)  Total economy, excluding the financial sector, public sector, agriculture and fishing. 2006 figures for EU value added.
1.  Structural characteristics and recent 
trends
The distributive trade sector comprises a very large number 
of companies, encompassing all the points of sale within 
the scope of an economy, regardless of their size (often 
very small) and the products they sell. For example, in 
the euro area, three out of ten private sector companies 
(excluding finance, agriculture and fishing) belong to 
the distributive trade sector. In Belgium, the proportion 
is actually one in three, a bit higher than the average in 
the euro area and in the three neighbouring countries  ; 
this difference is attributable primarily to the particularly 
high number of wholesalers in Belgium (wholesalers alone 
represent 10.3 %), which is a regional logistics centre, as is 
the Netherlands.
In terms of turnover, the distributive trade sector is 
an even more important part of the economy. This is 
essentially due to the wholesale segment, given its role 
as intermediary between producers and retailers. In 
Belgium, wholesalers actually generate nearly a quarter 
(24  %) of private sector turnover, excluding the finan-
cial, agricultural and fishing sectors. Conversely, they 
employ relatively few workers and create little added 
value proportional to their turnover. Furthermore, the 
wholesale trade is more productive than the retail trade, 
because it is more capital-intensive. The retail trade, 
which is labour-intensive, carries more weight in terms 
of employment.
This contrasting situation with respect to workers employed 
within the distributive trade sector must be understood in 
the context of strong job growth in the sector overall since 
the launch of Economic and Monetary Union in 1999. Of 
the 15 million jobs created in the euro area between 1999 
and 2009, around one in seven was created in distributive 
trade. However, the structure of employment in this sector 
is different from that of the rest of the economy in several 
respects. For example, distribution, and the retail segment 
in particular, includes a high proportion of self-employed 
workers, especially in Belgium, due to the relatively high 
number of small points of sale, even though this pro-
portion is not as high as in some southern European 
countries, such as Greece or Italy. Part-time work is also 
more common in distributive trade (particularly in the 
Netherlands), and there are more young workers in this 
sector than in the rest of the economy. This last character-
istic is, however, less pronounced in Belgium, although at 
the euro area level, more than 40 % of jobs for the under-
25 age group come from this sector. Female workers are 
also proportionally more prevalent in this sector  ; at the 
euro area level, one in eight women is employed in the 
retail trade. Furthermore, work in the sector is less skilled 
and less well paid, even by comparison with other sectors 
with a high percentage of low-skilled workers. The level of 37
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union membership is generally low in the sector, but not 
in Belgium, where it is very high and in fact higher than in 
the rest of the economy. As a result, distributive trade has 
a potentially important role to play with respect to grow-
ing employment, in particular for specific groups such as 
low-skilled workers.
This role depends notably on developments in the market 
shares of the different point-of-sale categories, principally 
in the grocery sector. It is interesting to note that Belgium 
and each of its neighbouring countries all have their own 
specific feature in this field. In Germany, hard discounters 
have a 36  % market share, by far the highest proportion 
in the euro area. France is dominated by hypermarkets 
(42  % market share), whereas supermarkets are the pri-
mary retailers in the Netherlands (64 % share) due to the 
near absence of hypermarkets because of land-use plan-
ning rules. Supermarkets are also dominant in Belgium, 
with a market share of 50  %, although it is important to 
specify that soft discounters  (1) are part of this category 
and have a market share of 18 % all to themselves. This is 
by far the biggest market share for soft discounters in the 
euro area (Germany is next with a share of around 10 %). 
Only a couple of Nordic countries (Norway and Denmark) 
have higher soft discounter market shares.
Another characteristic of Belgium is the greater preva-
lence of small-scale grocery stores and specialised shops, 
which have a combined market share of 31 %, compared 
with 24 % for the euro area, and even less in each of the 
three neighbouring countries ; this is demonstrated by the 
abundance – compared with neighbouring countries – of 
stores in the grocery sector relative to the population. The 
euro area average is slightly higher than that of Belgium 
(2.6 stores for 1 000 inhabitants compared with 2.3 in 
Belgium) due to the influence of southern countries, 
where small points of sale are still numerous. By contrast, 
in terms of sales area per 1 000 inhabitants, Belgium is 
as far ahead of the three neighbouring countries as it is 
ahead of the euro area average. Figures tracking sales 
per store confirm the high proportion of small stores in 
Belgium relative to Germany and especially to France. 
Figures showing the number of stores relative to surface 
area, for their part, reflect Belgium and the Netherlands’ 
high population density. The large number of small-sized 
points of sale in Belgium, and notably of specialised 
shops, may have an impact on prices, and indicates that 
in principal Belgium still has room to generate economies 
of scale. This high proportion may result from the type of 
regulations that currently govern large outlets, but the 
high number of specialised shops is undoubtedly also 
largely attributable to the Belgian consumer’s preference 
for this type of point of sale.
(1)  Soft discounters have a proportionally higher amount of fresh produce and 
brand-name goods, whereas hard discounters offer primarily non-perishable 
goods and private discount-label goods.
Chart 2  mArkEt shArE of thE DiffErEnt cAtEgoriEs 
of points of sAlE in thE grocEry sEctor  (1)
(percentages, 2009 figures)
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Sources : Euromonitor and Eurosystem calculations.
(1)  The grocery sector includes not only food products, but also the common 
household goods sold in supermarkets.
Table  1  Points of sale in the grocery sector  (1)
(2009 figures)
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per store  
(in €  
thousand)  (2)
 




Sales area  




BE  ......... 2.3 1 224 81 546
EA  ........ 2.6 890 33 459
DE  ........ 1.3 1 480 30 488
FR  ......... 1.4 1 866 17 443
NL   ......... 2.0 915 81 345
Sources : Eurostat, Euromonitor and Eurosystem calculations.
(1)  The grocery sector includes not only food products, but also the common household   
products sold in supermarkets.
(2)  Adjusted for purchasing power parity.
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Despite the resilience of small stores and specialised shops 
in Belgium, the emergence of hard discounters has been 
one of the most important trends in the grocery sector in 
recent years. Hard discounters offer relatively little variety 
in their product range, most of which consists of private-
label goods. The sales area is small and the focus is on 
cutting costs in order to offer the best prices. A distinc-
tion is generally made between hard discounters (very 
low prices, only private labels and a high volume of non-
perishable food) and soft discounters (which also offer 
brand-name goods and more fresh produce). Between 
1999 and 2009, the market share of hard discounters 
rose from 10  % to 14  % in the euro area, but this rise 
obscures very different trends from one country to the 
next. Germany and Austria are the two countries where 
the share of hard discounters is the highest (respectively 
36  % and 23  % in 2009), whereas Belgium and the 
Netherlands fall into a second group in which the market 
share of hard discounters is over 10 % (respectively 15 % 
and 12  % in 2009). The high and growing market share 
of soft discounters is another characteristic of the Belgian 
market. The development of soft discounters, and espe-
cially that of hard discounters, is likely to have an impact 
on consumer price trends, given that these retailers 
offer lower-price products. Because hard discounters are 
generally smaller in size, they are easier to open than are 
super- or hypermarkets, and can thus help boost compe-
tition despite planning rules. However, it is important to 
take into account the fact that hard discounters do not 
target exactly the same consumers and so are not exactly 
in the same market as super- and hypermarkets, because 
those retailers’ customers make decisions not only based 
on the price.
Similarly, whereas private labels do not necessarily compete 
for the same customers as well-established brands, they 
also disrupt the structure of the retail trade. Private labels 
are developed by retailers and belong to them, although 
the retailers do not always produce the goods themselves. 
These products generally have a high degree of penetra-
tion among fairly basic products  ; packaged food items 
are one good example. In Belgium, private-label goods’ 
market share in this sub-segment rose from 26  % in 2001 
to 31  % in 2009. This market share is among the highest 
in the euro area. Only in Germany and the Netherlands is 
the percentage higher. This growth of private labels has 
been facilitated by the consolidation of the grocery sector, 
in which a certain number of retailers are present in several 
countries and have grown big enough to enjoy economies 
of scale and launch their own brands. Just like the rise of 
Chart 3  mArkEt shArE of hArD DiscountErs AnD privAtE lABEls
(percentages)
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Sources : ACNielsen, Euromonitor and Eurosystem calculations.
(1)  The grocery sector includes not only food products, but also the common household products sold in supermarkets.
(2)  Only stores larger than 100 m².39
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Chart 4  sizE of thE onlinE rEtAil sEgmEnt
















































































































Sources : Euromonitor and Eurosystem calculations.
hard discounters, that of private labels can be expected to 
exert downward pressure on prices.
A downward effect on prices is also likely to result from 
the surge in online retailing, which is sometimes consid-
ered the closest thing to the “perfect market”, where con-
sumers can easily compare prices and geographic location 
is not very important. Those factors are expected to lead 
to lower prices and less divergence as a result of better 
competition and bigger economies of scale. Online retail 
trade mainly involves particular categories of goods and 
services which do not include food products, for instance. 
In Belgium, online retailing is still limited, accounting 
for just over 3  % of store-based sales, compared with a 
little over 4  % for the euro area and 5-8  % in the three 
neighbouring countries, which have the most developed 
online commerce in the euro area along with Finland. The 
growth in online retailing in Europe, and more specifi-
cally in smaller countries like Belgium, has been primarily 
slowed by the barriers that remain between countries, 
and this explains why barely 2-4 % of online transactions 
cross borders. These barriers are numerous, and include 
technical, payment, delivery, language and consumer pro-
tection problems, or even VAT differences. A recent study 
by the Federal Public Service Economy  (1) also cites weak 
entrepreneurship in Belgium and the conservative nature 
(1)  FPS Economy, La facilitation de l’offre d’ecommerce en Belgique (Study on 
facilitating the supply of e-commerce in Belgium). http ://economie.fgov.be/fr/
binaries/Etude_e_commerce_Belgique_2011_tcm326-133937.pdf
Box 1 –   Effects of changes in the structure of distributive trade on inflation 
measurements
The structural changes identified earlier – the growing share of discounters, private labels and online retailers – 
have implications for measuring inflation. Two types of problem can arise. On the one hand, if the sample used 
to create the price index is not adapted to reflect these structural changes, there is a risk that the sample will 
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grow progressively less representative. This could lead to errors in measuring inflation, especially if price trends are 
systematically different depending on the type of store or type of product, and if the relative shares of the different 
types of stores and products change. This argues in favour of frequently updating the sample of products and 
points of sale included in the calculation of the consumer price index.
In addition, when the sample is adapted, the methodology used to add new stores and new products is not 
neutral. In principle, the price level of a new store/product will not be the same as that of the rest of the sample, 
or that of the store/product that it is replacing. Thus, it makes sense to correct for this price difference and also 
take into account the difference in quality (the retailer’s quality of service in terms of location, surroundings, 
presentation, availability of personnel, number of check-out lanes, etc.). In practice, however, national statistical 
institutes often use a transition method that attributes all of the difference in price to a difference in quality (of 
the retailer’s service level).
This practice can cause inflation to be overestimated, as illustrated by the following theoretical example. Consider the 
case of a small store that is replaced by a supermarket whose prices are lower, which is then in turn replaced by a 
discounter whose prices are even lower. If the price difference is entirely neutralised each time the store is replaced, 
the lower price levels of the supermarket and discounter will have no impact on the index level. As a result, inflation is 
overestimated because no price cut is factored in  (1). In the literature, this problem is referred to as “new outlet bias”.
It is not easy to quantify this bias exactly, and no estimate is available for Belgium or the euro area. While estimates 
for countries such as the USA, Portugal, France and Germany for the 1990s indicate that this type of bias was not 
very significant, in the light of recent, rapid changes in market share among these retail formats, public authorities 
must nevertheless remain focused on the challenge of correctly measuring inflation. Apart from the importance of 
frequent sample updating, additional research in the area is desirable, for example in order to correctly estimate 
differences in quality. In Belgium, the index reform (base 2012 = 100) currently in preparation and which is likely 
to be applied starting in 2014 (replacing, after eight years, the index 2004 = 100 introduced in 2006) is a chance 
to guarantee the representativeness of the index by also including an adequate method for sample updating. This 
will also put the index in a position to incorporate future changes, such as the likely growth of online retailing (in 
which Belgium currently lags the rest of the euro area).
intEgrAtion of nEw typEs of sAlEs points or proDucts into 













Source : Adapted from Greenlees and McClelland (2008).
(1)  Unless the price difference does actually only reflect a difference in quality. Nevertheless, the very success of the formats offering lower prices indicates that 
consumers tend to think that the price difference more than offsets any difference in quality.41
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of the retail trade sector as further potential obstacles to 
the development of online retailing in Belgium.
2.  Regulation
Distributive trade sector regulations are one of the factors 
that may explain the material differences observed between 
the countries of the euro area with respect to the structural 
characteristics of commerce and employment in this sector, 
but also recent trends. As a matter of fact, Belgium is not in 
a very good position when it comes to retail trade regula-
tion. According to the OECD’s Product Market Regulation 
(PMR) indicator, only the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
has more restrictive regulations than Belgium. The PMR 
indicator is calculated using six base indicators that draw 
on qualitative data collected from the various countries 
concerned and codified on a standardised scale of 0 to 6. 
A higher score indicates more restrictive regulation  (1). While 
the indicator’s simplicity is clearly an advantage, it is also a 
limitation. The criteria used sometimes offer a rudimentary 
view of reality, as questions often ask for straightforward 
binary (yes / no) answers. Furthermore, the PMR is calculated 
based on the existence of rules rather than their content.
The principal laws and provisions that explain Belgium’s 
poor ranking are the planning rules for large retailers, 
legally protected monopolies (pharmaceuticals), protec-
tions for existing firms, and laws governing opening 
hours. Furthermore, these are the regulations most often 
cited as potential obstacles to retail businesses, along 
with the Law on market practices and the protection 
of consumers, which covers a wide variety of provisions 
(seasonal sales, combined sales, etc.)  (2).
The OECD has published this indicator every five years 
since 1998. The most recent figures (February 2009) 
(1)  The six base indicators are : registration with the commercial register (for the sale 
of food products), licences or permits needed to carry out a commercial activity 
(for the sale of food products), specific regulations for large outlets (in practice, 
only the minimum surface area to which regulations apply), protection of existing 
firms, opening hours (whether or not regulation exists and, secondarily, whether 
the regulation is national or local), and price controls (questions subdivided 
by product category). For detailed information on this indicator, see Box 1 in 
Baugnet et al. (2009).
(2)  For detailed information on these regulations, see Baugnet et al. (2009).
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Sources : OECD and Eurosystem calculations.42
refer to 2008. In the Structural Issues Report, however, 
the various national central banks (NCBs) were asked to 
update the questionnaire that the OECD uses to calcu-
late its indicator using data for the year 2010. The goal 
was to evaluate any progress made since 2008. In the 
four countries that have made changes to regulations 
since 2008 – Belgium among them – all of the changes 
involved easing regulations, resulting in a (modest) drop 
in their indicators, according to unofficial Eurosystem esti-
mates. Even so, Belgium remains at the back of the pack, 
although it has now caught up with Austria.
This drop in the Belgian indicator, according to the SIR, is 
due to the assessment of the “Ikea” Law’s effect on the 
protection of existing firms. Whereas economic criteria will 
no longer be considered in granting licences and permits 
– stipulated by the Law of 22 December 2009 transpos-
ing the Services Directive into national legislation – thus 
easing these restrictions, it is the assessment of the limited 
role of the representatives of professional organisations 
that is influencing the degree of regulation estimated in 
2010. The Directive effectively forbids the involvement of 
professional organisations in permitting decisions, but, 
when the Directive was transposed, the legislature did not 
do away with the consulting role of the National Socio-
Economic Committee for the Retail Sector (NSECRS), 
implicitly recognising that its non-binding opinions could 
not be considered an intervention in the decision. While 
this aspect of the legislation remains open to criticism, 
in any event the EU Directive takes precedence over the 
national legislation. Nevertheless, it is by no means certain 
that the OECD would make the same interpretation, so 
the progress actually observed would not necessarily be 
recorded as such by the official indicators.
One of the criteria taken into consideration for the PMR 
is the legislation on opening days and hours. This is a 
sensitive topic, because it deals with cultural and societal 
norms. In Belgium, opening days and hours in the retail 
trade are governed by the Law of 10 November 2006  (1). 
The criterion used by the OECD for the PMR indicator is 
the existence of relevant regulations, and the fact that it 
is a national regulation is an aggravating factor  (2). This 
being the case, Belgium receives a maximum score of 6, 
like many other countries. To better gauge the flexibility of 
opening hours, it makes sense to look at the actual extent 
of the regulation. To this end, the Eurosystem created a 
new specific indicator focusing solely on regulations gov-
erning opening hours. It draws on information supplied by 
the members of the task force for the 2011 SIR (see Box 2 
for more details). According to this indicator, Belgium is 
still one of the most restrictive countries, coming in ahead 
of only Cyprus and Austria. The explicit obligation to be 
closed one day of the week is particularly detrimental to 
Belgium’s score  (3). However, when interpreting this indica-
tor, it must be kept in mind that retailers often, especially 
in Belgium, decide not to operate the maximum number 
of hours allowed by law, which means that the average 
number of hours stores are open is below the legally 
allowed ceiling. The collective bargaining agreements in 
place in the retail trade sector probably have something 
to do with this as well.
Even so, there is substantial correlation between country 
rankings according to the OECD’s PMR indicator and the 
opening hours indicator (Spearman rank correlation of 
0.73, significant at 99.5 %), which indicates that the pen-
chant for regulation tends to affect multiple aspects of a 
sector, and that Belgium appears to suffer from legislative 
creep. Progress has been made, admittedly, largely due 
to the transposition of EU Directives, but a real effort to 
simplify and streamline existing laws needs to be made. 
Even though not all regulations are restrictive, the mere 
(1)  This law consolidated and updated earlier legislation from 1960 and 1973 
without altering the main concepts. With respect to opening days, the principle 
is that businesses must be closed one day a week, or rather an uninterrupted 
24-hour period starting on the business’ chosen day – Sunday by default, but not 
necessarily – at 5:00 am or 1:00 pm. With respect to opening hours, the principle 
is that businesses may be open between 5:00 am and 8:00 pm from Monday 
to Saturday, and until 9:00 pm on Friday and the day before legal holidays. 
Three types of exceptions may be granted : depending upon the type of business 
(transport hubs, newsstands, petrol stations, etc.), for exceptional circumstances 
(15 days per year maximum) and in tourist areas.
(2)  For example, the UK – a country where opening hours are virtually unlimited 
but nevertheless governed by specific legislation – receives the maximum score. 
Conversely, Germany receives a lower score because the Länder are responsible 
for opening hour laws.
(3)  In other countries, such as France for example, there are indirect regulations 
governing opening hours via labour laws (Sunday opening hours). The indicator 
does not take these into account.
Chart 6  EurosystEm inDicAtor for opEning hours 
rEgulAtions
(0 = minimum regulation, 1 = maximum regulation)























Sources : OECD and Eurosystem calculations.43
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Box 2 –   Methodology of the Eurosystem indicator for opening hours 
regulations
Because of the limitations of the PMR indicator for opening hours, the Eurosystem developed a new, more 
detailed indicator exclusively designed to accurately reflect the maximum number of store opening hours and 
days authorised under national law. For countries with a variety of regulations at the regional and local level, the 
regulations most representative of the national legislation are used.
The indicator is based on six variables, chosen to reflect the period during which stores are not authorised to open :
1.    Time of day from which stores are authorised to open (between 0 and 24 ; average for all days of the week, 
Sunday included ; if opening on Sunday is unauthorised, the variable takes the maximum value of 24) ;
2.    Time of day by which stores must be closed (same as for variable 1, but defined as equal to 24 minus the 
weekly average so that a high value accurately reflects a restrictive regulation) ;
3.    Maximum number of opening hours per day (defined as equal to 24 minus the maximum number of opening 
hours) ;
4.    Maximum number of opening hours per week (defined as equal to 168 [7x24] minus the maximum number 
of opening hours) ;
5.    Minimum number of closing days per year ;
6.    Minimum number of Sundays and holidays when stores must be closed (defined as equal to 52 minus the 
maximum number of Sundays and holidays when stores may be open).
Each variable is re-graded on a scale of 0 (minimum regulation) to 1 (maximum regulation). The variables are put 
into three groups : limits on opening and closing hours (variables 1 and 2), maximum number of daily and weekly 
opening hours (variables 3 and 4) and minimum number of closing days per year (variables 5 and 6). Each group is 
assigned a weight of one-third, and within each group, the weight is divided either equally (group 2) or unequally 
(weights of 0.75 and 0.25) in order to give greater weight to variables thought to best reflect the constraints 
(variables 2 and 6).
In the euro area (with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia), only Ireland and Slovakia have no opening hours 
regulations. Among the other countries, only Italy is governed by local regulations rather than national regulations. 
Certain countries (Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) have national, regional and local laws. Belgian 
legislation stands out because of the fact that it requires a minimum of 52 closing days per year (one day a week), 
an obligation that exists in only two other countries, but which is much more flexible in those countries  : 4 days 
minimum in Greece and 10 days minimum in Cyprus. The new indicator does not, however, take exceptions into 
account. These are relatively significant in Belgium and fall into three categories : according to the type of business 
(transport hubs, newsstands, petrol stations, etc.), for exceptional circumstances (15 days per year maximum) and 
in tourist areas. As for regulations governing opening hours and times, Belgium has more regulations than any 
other euro area country, but they are not necessarily the most restrictive. For example, with regard to the maximum 
number of opening hours per day, Austria, Finland, Italy and Cyprus impose a lower limit than Belgium does. The 
same is true of the maximum number of opening hours per week, where Austria, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus are 
also more restrictive than Belgium.
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Existence of regulation  ............... Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Type of regulation  ................... National   national National National Nat. / Reg. National National Local
Maximum number of opening hours 
per day  ............................ 15   16 14 16 13
Maximum number of opening hours 
per week  ........................... 72   91
Opening time  .......................
Ordinary weekdays  ................ 6   5 7 5 7
Saturdays   ......................... 6   5 7 5 7
Sundays and holidays  ..............   5 12 13 5 7
Special weekdays  ..................   5
Closing time  ........................
Ordinary weekdays  ................ 21   20 21 21 22
Saturdays   ......................... 18   20 18 20 20 22
Sundays and holidays  ..............   20 18 18 20 22
Special weekdays  ..................   21  (2)
Minimum number of closing days 
per year  ............................   52  (3) 4
Maximum number of opening days 
on Sundays and holidays  ............. 0   15 5 4 2 14
















Existence of regulation  ............... Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Type of regulation  ................... National Nat. / Loc. Nat. / Loc. National Nat. / Reg. National National
Maximum number of opening hours 
per day  ............................ 18 15
Maximum number of opening hours 
per week  ........................... 61 84 84.5
Opening time  .......................
Ordinary weekdays  ................ 6 6 6 5 4
Saturdays   ......................... 6 6 6 5 4
Sundays and holidays  .............. 6 6 8 11 4
Special weekdays  ..................
Closing time  ........................
Ordinary weekdays  ................ 21 22 20 19
Saturdays   ......................... 18 22 20 20
Sundays and holidays  .............. 13 22 23 22
Special weekdays  .................. 15  (5)
Minimum number of closing days 
per year  ............................ 10
Maximum number of opening days 
on Sundays and holidays  ............. 12 8 0
Exceptions to the general regulations   . .. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sources : Eurosystem calculations based on information supplied by the OECD and the NCBs.
(1)  If there is no specific regulation, the space is left blank.
(2)  Friday.
(3)  One day per week.
(4)  Regulation for summer opening hours. In winter : the maximum number of opening hours is 14.5 per day and 82 per week, and the closing time is 7:30 pm 
during the week and 7:00 pm on Sundays.
(5)  Wednesday.
 45
The disTribuTive Trade secTor and  
iTs impacT on euro area prices
fact that they exist can influence market participants’ 
perception of obstacles. This is likely to limit competition 
and be a source of inefficiency.
3.  Competition
To assess the potential consequences of regulatory 
constraints, and thus to analyse the effective level of 
competition in the Belgian distributive trade sector 
compared with that of the euro area and neighbour-
ing countries, several dimensions must be taken into 
account. The first is the geographic dimension  ; we 
can look at several levels  : local, regional, national, 
international, or a combination of those. The second is 
the sector dimension, because not all retailers compete 
in the same market. For example, pharmacies do not 
compete with clothing stores  ; on the other hand, a 
grocer can wind up competing with various forms of 
retailers (supermarkets, online sellers, petrol stations, 
etc.). A third dimension is the segment of consumers 
targeted by the retailer. A supermarket offering a wide 
variety of products is not in direct competition with 
a hard discounter offering only a limited number of 
its private discount-label products, even though both 
belong to the grocery sector. Lastly, we can also make 
a distinction between downstream competition, or 
competition between retailers vis-à-vis consumers, and 
upstream competition, or competition between retail-
ers vis-à-vis suppliers. This last dimension, however, is 
outside the scope of this article.
We initially analyse competition in the grocery sector at 
the national level. We have used two tools to quantify 
the level of competition  : measures for concentration 
and for profitability. Measuring a market’s concentration 
is an ex-ante measurement in the sense that, even if we 
expect a negative correlation between concentration 
and competition, this is not always borne out by the 
facts given the possibility for explicit or implicit collu-
sion, or even barriers to entry or regulations preventing 
any sector consolidation. Thus, weak concentration does 
not guarantee strong competition, just as strong con-
centration does not automatically prevent competition. 
Furthermore, the advantages of strong concentration 
linked to efficiency gains may offset the negative effects 
of weak competition.
To calculate market concentration, we use the k-firm 
Concentration Ratio – CRk , i.e. the sum of the market shares 
of the k largest companies present in a market. According 
to this measurement, we note that the Belgian grocery 
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(1)  The grocery sector includes not only food products, but also the common household products sold in supermarkets.
(2)  CRk = Concentration ratio of the k largest companies in terms of market share, calculated by adding together their market shares.
(3)  Adjusted to account for the income of self-employed workers.46
market is less concentrated overall than the average in the 
euro area and the three neighbouring countries, regardless 
of the value chosen for k up to the tenth company. The 
Belgian grocery sector is, after Slovakia, the least concen-
trated in the euro area excluding the southern countries – 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal – where concentration is 
weaker due to the abundance of small shops  (1).
Because the concentration measurement does not tell us 
with certainty what the level of competition is, it is useful to 
pair it with a profitability measurement, which may be con-
sidered an ex-post measurement  (2). In Belgium, the profit 
margin in the grocery sector is relatively small (Belgium 
ranks better in the euro area according to profit margin, 
4th, than it does according to concentration, 6th, as meas-
ured by the CR5). If we take into account the various dis-
tributive trade sub-sectors, we note that the profit margin 
in Belgium is lower than the average in the euro area and 
the three neighbouring countries, with the exception of the 
wholesale segment profit margin, which is slightly weaker 
in France. If we consider distributive trade as a whole, the 
profit margin in Belgium is actually the weakest of any euro 
area country. The combination of weak concentration and 
a small profit margin suggests a relatively high level of com-
petition in the grocery sector in Belgium.
In Germany and France, the grocery sector is relatively 
concentrated, but that does not appear to prevent compe-
tition. Indeed the profit margins in those countries are rela-
tively narrow. This is even more the case in Austria, where 
the market is highly concentrated as the margin is very low. 
In Greece and Spain, the situation is reversed  : grocers are 
the least concentrated in the euro area, but profit margins 
are the highest (with the exception of Slovenia).
Whereas national competition measurements suggest a 
relatively high level of competition in the grocery sector 
in Belgium compared with the average in the euro area 
and neighbouring countries, it remains to be seen if the 
same is true at the local level. In fact, national concentra-
tion measurements can overestimate the competition in a 
market if there is collusion with retail chains splitting up 
a geographic market, leading to a lack of competition at 
the local level  (3). However, the criteria for the local market 
have yet to be defined, and would not be the same for 
a densely populated urban area and a sparsely populated 
rural area. Analysing the distribution of grocery points 
of sale in Belgium with a sales area of over 100 square 
metres, as was done in Baugnet et al. (2009)  (4), it appears 
that the location of stores matches expectations, i.e. it is 
determined by population density, and that it does not 
appear to be dysfunctional in general.
The study presented in the 2011 SIR covers ten euro area 
countries, including Belgium, and thus provides a com-
plement to the observations in Baugnet et al. (2009). In 
addition to national concentration, the study measures 
local concentration at the level of individual stores and 
parent companies (because two local stores that belong 
to the same parent company cannot be considered true 
competitors). Market shares are calculated on the base 
of sales areas in square metres  (5), and the local market 
is defined as the sum of the retailers present within a 
radius of five or ten kilometres  (6). Concentration at the 
local level was measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Data on the location of points of sale in 2010 
were taken from Ac Nielsen, which covers nine countries 
and 130 000 points of sale, and from FPS Economy for 
data on Belgium. This list was then converted into a 
geographic database by using geocoding services, which 
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(1)  An alternative to the CRk indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
This index takes into account all the firms participating in the market, but gives 
greater weight to those with larger market shares (using the sum of the squares 
of the companies’ market shares). The index ranges from 0 to 10 000, from 
perfect competition to a pure monopoly. In general, it is considered that an 
HHI over 1 800 indicates a highly concentrated market, and that below 1 000 
the market is weakly concentrated. The average HHI for 2004-2009 for the 
grocery sector confirms the results of the CRk, as the HHI for Belgium is 590, less 
than the average for the euro area (979) and the three neighbouring countries 
(DE : 1 018, FR : 863, NL : 1 162). If we look only at the supermarket segment 
(non-specialised, self-service food retailers), as was the case in Baugnet et al. 
(2009), the concentration is higher, with an HHI of 1 890 in Belgium (based on 
the turnover of the seven biggest companies).
(2)  Given that there are proportionally more self-employed workers in the retail 
trade, and especially in the southern countries, we have adjusted profit margins 
to account for the implied compensation of the self-employed worker, by 
stripping it out of the margin.
(3)  Conversely, concentration at the national level may underestimate competition if 
a few retail chains present in the country are systematically present in every local 
market.
(4)  See the map on p. 44 of Baugnet et al. (2009).
(5)  This indicator was used because it was available for all countries. Alternative 
indicators for measuring market share are the number of cash registers or 
turnover. For countries where it is possible, the three indicators were calculated, 
and the correlation between the three indicators is above 0.9.
(6)  Using a methodology similar to that used in Baugnet et al. (2009), which took its 
cue from a study published in 2008 by the UK Competition Commission (UKCC).47
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makes it possible to turn addresses into geographic coor-
dinates such as those used by GPS systems.
In Finland, the strong concentration at the national level 
is confirmed at the local level, but such is by no means 
the case for every country. Whereas at the national level, 
southern European countries exhibit the weakest con-
centration for the grocery sector as a whole, reflecting 
the fact that those countries still have a large number of 
small businesses, it is far from the case when we analyse 
the situation at the local level for points of sale over 
100 square metres. Whereas Italy and, to a lesser extent, 
Spain, also have a low level of concentration locally, this is 
not true of Greece or Portugal.
As for Belgium, its position is average both at the national 
level by group and at the local level by store. By contrast, 
if we examine local concentration at the parent company 
level, which is clearly the most relevant measure, Belgium 
is characterised by the weakest concentration of any of the 
countries included in the study  (1). Among the neighbour-
ing countries, France exhibits the highest concentration at 
the local level, followed by the Netherlands and Germany, 
whose situation is more intermediate  (2). The research by 
Baugnet  et al. (2009) already showed a weak level of 
concentration at the local level in Belgium, based on a 
comparison with the results of two studies devoted to con-
centration at the local level in the UK and France. The SIR 
study, which covers – using a harmonised methodology – 
Belgium and nine other euro area countries, confirms this 
weak level of concentration at the local level in Belgium.
4.  Impact on prices
The retail sector, and more specifically the grocery sector, 
is characterised in Belgium by both a high degree of com-
petition and a significant penetration by discounters and 
private labels, but not by online retailers. It is useful to 
study the ties between these characteristics and price for-
mation, in particular in the context of a very invasive regu-
latory environment. Competition, structural characteristics 
and regulations can all potentially affect both price levels 
and price dynamics. The effect of tougher competition 
on the price level is theoretically a downward impact 
because the mark-up is lower in a competitive situation. 
The market will also tend to adhere more closely to condi-
tions compatible with the law of one price (LOOP), which 
stipulates that, in an efficient market, each identical good 
must be sold at the same price at every point of sale in the 
market. The upshot is a lesser dispersion of price (levels) 
(for homogeneous products), and a lesser dispersion of 
price (levels) between countries, given the existence of a 
common market and the introduction of the euro.
Furthermore, because competition has the effect of reduc-
ing mark-ups, companies have less leeway to avoid passing 
on cost fluctuations, and this influences price dynamics, 
i.e. inflation. The result is more frequent price adjust-
ments (confirmed by the results of the Inflation Persistence 
Network, updated at the time of the 2011 SIR  (3)), a more 
pronounced and swifter transmission of costs, and thus a 
more volatile inflation rate. In a competitive market, there 
will also be greater symmetry in the transmission of cost 
fluctuations between cost increases and decreases.
It remained to be seen if these expected theoretical effects 
would be confirmed empirically, which was done in the 
context of the SIR. For example, to analyse and identify 
the factors that influence the dispersions of price levels 
among countries, one of the approaches used consisted 
in building a model dealing with eleven euro area coun-
tries (the first twelve Member States, with the exception 
of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) and 146 products, 
while incorporating both the classic determinants of price 
level inequalities identified in the literature and a series 
of variables describing the differences in structure in the 
distributive trade sector. The results of this panel-type esti-
mate based on product  (4) and country dimensions (with 
fixed effects for products and countries) partially match 
theoretical expectations.
With respect to the classic determinants, relative income 
levels and VAT rates have a significantly positive effect on 
price differentials. It is assumed that higher standards of 
living go hand in hand with higher price levels. As for VAT, 
a certain degree of harmonisation notwithstanding, gaps 
remain among the Member States that influence differ-
ences in price level. In addition, the intensity of spending 
negatively affects price gaps. This indicator measures 
consumers’ attentiveness to prices  : they pay more atten-
tion to higher-priced items and/or those that account 
for a large share of their spending (literature on rational 
inattention  (5)). For example, if Italian households consume 
more pasta than those in other countries, they will prob-
ably spend more time researching and comparing pasta 
prices, and we can expect those efforts to affect price 
differences. Population density also negatively influences 
(1)  For both a 5km and 10km radius. In the case of Belgium, this consolidation 
between different entities belonging to the same group was applied to the fullest 
extent to avoid underestimating concentration. For example, Spar stores are 
considered to belong to the Colruyt group. Even using such an approach, which 
could overestimate concentration at the local level, the Belgian market emerges 
as the least concentrated.
(2)  If we measure competition at the store level, concentration is weakest in the 
Netherlands.
(3)  The principal findings being that greater competition is associated with more 
frequent price changes in the retail sector and more particularly in supermarkets 
and hypermarkets, although their magnitude is not bigger on average.
(4)  Based on the 146 series of products available in the Eurostat purchasing power 
parities (PPP) database.
(5)  See, for example, Sims (2003).48
price levels because high density is likely to be accompa-
nied by greater efficiency (a densely populated area offers 
a larger market, permitting economies of scale, for exam-
ple, or a more optimal point-of-sale size, which would be 
impossible to achieve in a more sparsely populated area).
With respect to the variables intended to measure the 
structural characteristics of the distributive trade sector, 
the picture painted by those dealing with concentration 
appears to be contradictory at first glance. On the one 
hand, the CR5 degree of concentration appears to exert 
an upward pressure on the price level, suggesting that 
more competition would effectively reduce prices. On 
the other hand, the HHI indicator points in the opposite 
direction, as it is associated with a downward pressure 
on prices. This apparent contradiction is ultimately not 
so surprising, given the ambivalence of the theoretical 
impact of concentration on prices : it drives prices upward 
by reducing competition but drives them downward by 
improving efficiency (tied to returns to scale).
The indicator based on profitability (adjusted to account 
for the implied incomes of self-employed workers) shows 
the expected sign  : prices are higher when this indica-
tor is high. Lastly, the variables reflecting the degree of 
regulation give mixed results  : only the indicators related 
to barriers to entry show the expected positive sign. By 
contrast, operational restrictions do not have a significant 
impact, whereas greater price controls and labour market 
regulation exert downward pressure on prices.
Overall, these results suggest that structural character-
istics can have an impact on price levels. They may thus 
explain the divergences observed within the euro area. The 
creation of the common market and introduction of the 
euro notwithstanding, and despite a certain convergence 
between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, there are 
still significant inequalities in the prices of goods among 
euro area countries, although they are smaller than the 
differences in services prices. Belgium is among the most 
expensive countries, with a price level more than 10  % 
higher than the euro area average. The only countries with 
higher prices are Ireland, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
and Finland, and Belgium is just ahead of France, whereas 
the Netherlands and especially Germany have lower price 
levels. Belgium’s price level gap relative to the euro area 
average has steadily widened since 2003.
Knowing that there remains a significant dispersion in 
prices among euro area countries, it makes sense to ask 
whether the dispersion among countries is greater than 
what exists within each country. If the dispersion of prices 
between two cities in the same country is smaller than 
that between two cities the same distance apart but in 
two different countries, that means that there is clearly 
a “border effect”. To do this, the SIR uses highly detailed 
Table  3  Summary of the econometric analySiS 
of factorS affecting differenceS in price 
levelS between countrieS  (1)
 
  classic determinants
Income level  ........................ Positive
VAT   ............................... Positive
Spending intensity  ................... Negative
Population density  ................... Negative
  variables that measure the structural 
characteristics of the distributive 
trade sector
Concentration (HHI)   .................. Negative
Concentration (CR5)   .................. Positive
Profitability  ......................... Positive
Regulation (barriers to entry)  .......... Positive
Regulation (price controls)  ............ Negative
Regulation (operational restrictions)  .... (2)
Regulation of the labour market (EPL)  (3)    .. Negative
Source : 2011 SIR.
(1)  Analysis covering eleven euro area countries (the first twelve Member States, 
excluding the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) and 146 products.
(2)  Not statistically significant.
(3)  EPL refers to the OECD’s Employment Protection Legislation indicator.
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(1)  The dispersion within the countries refers to the median of the coefficients of 
variation of prices within each country, and the dispersion between the countries 
refers to the coefficient of variation of the national average prices.49
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data on the prices of 356 food products in different cities 
in the euro area. By comparing for each product the 
median of the coefficients of variation of prices within 
each country with the coefficient of variation of the 
national average prices, we can see that the dispersion in 
prices among the countries is generally higher than the 
dispersion within the countries (most points fall above the 
45-degree line).
To verify that the border effect shown by this analysis does 
not simply hide a distance effect, due to the fact that cities 
in different countries are often farther away from each 
other than are cities within a country, an additional study 
was performed looking at four German cities (Berlin, Bonn, 
Karlsruhe and Munich) and four cities in four countries 
bordering Germany (Amsterdam, Brussels, Luxembourg 
and Paris). This analysis shows that, whereas the four cities 
in these four neighbouring countries are closer to each 
other (330 km on average) than are the four German cities 
(500 km on average), they exhibit a greater price dispersion 
than that of the four German cities, suggesting that the 
border effect is more important than the distance effect.
Apart from their impact on price levels, structural char-
acteristics also affect the transmission of shocks to con-
sumer prices. In the case of food products, an analysis 
using Vector Auto Regression (VAR) models performed 
as part of the SIR indicates that consumer prices tend 
to react less briskly than producer prices to a commod-
ity shock. Furthermore, it appears that responses vary 
considerably from one country and from one sector (type 
of food product) to another, and there seems to be a 
material link with structural characteristics. For example, 
greater penetration by discounters appears to be more 
likely to be associated with a strong transmission and, 
conversely, markets characterised by a greater number of 
small shops appear to be less sensitive to shocks coming 
from commodity prices.
This can be illustrated by looking at milk. The price 
of milk on the international market, as well as that 
on the EU internal market, experienced a significant 
upward shock during the first eight months of 2007, 
followed by a significant decline from end-2007, which 
lasted until mid-2009. An upward trend then took hold 
until early 2011. In 2007, consumer prices reacted 
fairly strongly and quickly, particularly in Belgium and 
Germany. In France and the Netherlands, the reaction 
was slower and more sluggish.
Conversely, the transmission of the drop in international 
prices, from 2008, was much more differentiated. Apart 
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from Germany, where consumer prices appear to have 
reacted fairly symmetrically, the decrease was slower 
and less pronounced in Belgium, and was much less 
perceptible in France and the Netherlands. The increase 
seen in Belgium between July 2009 and January 2010 
is attributable to a specific factor, which it would make 
sense to cancel out  ; it was caused by an agreement 
between Comeos (formerly Fedis), the Boerenbond, and 
the Algemeen Boerensyndicaat, an agreement under 
which Comeos undertook to pay a surcharge over six 
months – from July to December 2009 – capped at 
€ 0.14 per litre of drinking milk in order to offset farm-
ers’ losses stemming from the drop in international 
prices. In practice, it was the consumer who paid the 
surcharge, resulting in a (temporary) increase in con-
sumer prices.
Overall, the trend in consumer milk prices appears to 
show a highly competitive market in Germany : the trans-
mission in that country was brisk both during the upward 
phase (because it is hard not to pass on higher costs to 
the consumer in a competitive market, as margins are slim 
in principle) and during the downward phase. Belgium 
appears to fall somewhere in the middle  ; while the drop 
in consumer prices following the decrease in costs was not 
as pronounced as in Germany, it was more pronounced 
than in France or the Netherlands. This seems to corrobo-
rate certain difference observed between countries with 
respect to concentration indicators (lower in Belgium and 
Germany, higher in France) and to discounters’ market 
share, for example (particularly high in Germany, high in 
Belgium, and much weaker in France). The case of the 
Netherlands stands out, however, given its fairly average 
degree of concentration and large discounter market 
share. This may be attributable to a desire to restore mar-
gins after they were eroded by the impact of the price war 
that took place in the Netherlands after 2003  (1).
In addition, the Price Observatory highlighted, in its 
second quarter 2011 report, that pricing and marketing 
policies differ from one brand to the next, and strategies 
for so-called discount products and private-label products 
most closely approach a competitive price formation  (2). 
These products are distinctive not only for their lower 
prices, but also for their more pronounced and more 
symmetric transmission of cost fluctuations. We note that 
these brands exhibit above-average price volatility and 
react more strongly and more rapidly to cost increases and 
decreases. Thus, price trends for this type of milk were less 
asymmetric than the average.
Conclusion
At a time of consolidation and increasing internation-
alisation of the distributive trade sector, three major phe-
nomena have been simultaneously altering the structure 
of euro area trade for several years now  : the success of 
hard and soft discounters, the emergence of retailers’ 
private discount-label products, and the growth in online 
shopping. All three tend to exert downward pressure on 
price levels. Whereas the first two factors are particularly 
pronounced in Belgium, online shopping is less of a factor. 
Furthermore, these trends are not neutral with respect to 
inflation measurement, because the basket of consumer 
goods used to calculate the price index needs to reflect 
the extent of the three phenomena.
Belgium has a high number of points of sale, both relative 
to the surface area of the country – which makes sense 
given its high population density – and relative to its 
population. This is partly a reflection of the important role 
that small-scale grocers and specialised shops continue 
to play in the grocery sector. However, if we limit our 
analysis to points of sale larger than 100 square metres, 
these observations are confirmed by measurements of 
concentration and profit margins in the grocery sector at 
the national level, according to which Belgium’s position is 
relatively favourable with respect to the level of competi-
tion. These results also hold at the local level  ; if we con-
sider concentration by parent company, Belgium has the 
least concentrated market of the ten countries covered by 
the study. And yet, despite improvements in recent years, 
Belgian regulation of store locations, prices and business 
hours remains very intrusive and could discourage the 
opening of new points of sale.
Given the impact of the distributive trade sector’s structural 
characteristics on price-setting behaviour and on the differ-
ences in price levels within each country and between euro 
area countries, structural reforms are needed to enhance 
competition and take better advantage of the common 
market. A good first step would be the complete appli-
cation of the Services Directive, which would help foster 
increased market liberalisation and harmonisation. Other 
regulatory barriers, such as those linked to VAT or con-
sumer protection laws, could be harmonised and simplified 
in order to unlock economies of scale and the potential for 
online and cross-border trade. For Belgium, a simplification/
clarification of its multitude of regulations would already 
be significant progress, given that what is restricting the 
development of trade in Belgium is not so much the con-
straints imposed by the regulations as their complexity.
While the transition to more competitive markets may 
result in lower prices, it may also reduce price rigidity and 
(1)  See Box 4 in Baugnet et al.(2009).
(2)  Price Observatory, Analyse des prix : deuxième rapport trimestriel 2011 de 
l’institut des comptes nationaux (Analysis of prices : second quarterly report 2011 
of the National Accounts Institute).51
The disTribuTive Trade secTor and  
iTs impacT on euro area prices
thereby enhance the transmission of cost fluctuations to 
prices (making them more volatile). Such a change is also 
likely to lead to more symmetrical price formation. While 
the analysis performed as part of the SIR did not show 
any significant anomalies in Belgian competition, it is 
still necessary to continue monitoring price trends, a task 
assigned in particular to the Competition Authority and 
the Price Observatory.
Even though harmonising regulations and eliminating 
implicit barriers should help lessen differences within 
the euro area in terms of both the structure of trade 
and price formation, some differences are unavoidable 
due to consumer preferences and cultural differences 
from one country to the next, and even regionally. For 
example, the success in Belgium of soft discounters and 
private-label products has not been won solely at the 
expense of specialised shops, which still have a greater 
market share than their counterparts in neighbouring 
countries, suggesting that Belgian consumers still value 
the services provided by small retailers, even though their 
prices are higher. Similarly, the spread of discount brands 
has not caused the disappearance of name brands, 
which still have significant market share, even though 
price formation appears to be less competitive in this 
market segment.52
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